Clone myself.
Send clone through teleporter to pull lever.
360 no scope snipe the imposter clone motherfucker.
Claim credit for saving people.
Is cloning that much faster than running to the lever? Do you also keep a cloning machin always handy on you?
The teleporter is basically a cloning machine
Doesn’t it depend if the teleporter open a up a wormhole or used replication?
Depends if teleportation uses TCP or UDP
And what compression algorithm are they using?
Quantum mechanic wavelengths in mp3. So you might arrive a bit off.
UDP teleportation sounds pretty questionable.
SCTP
It won’t be me and, unless I have some loved one there, I’m not thoughtlessly jumping into suicide.
If it’s a wormhole or Niven-style teleporter, it’s unarguably you coming through the process. Star Trek… I’ll grant that the conversation gets a little more complicated.
i think this particular case implies itbis quantum teleportation where your body is destructed and simultaneously reassembled on the other side
I think teleportation is a really interesting philosophical question. If life is deterministic and there is no soul, then there should be no problem with teleportation. From a deterministic atheist perspective it should not be a problem, I wouldn’t teleport myself though 😅
I think it’s mostly a semantic argument: nothing is being “teleported”, it’s a copy. That copy will surely be a perfect copy of me at time T, and after T we’ll drift and become different folks, but a copy of me is not me, and if you punch the copy it doesn’t hurt me. SOMA showcases it pretty well! Anything else cannot even be conceived, right? And even if matter could be “transported” FTL into a different place, wouldn’t the “zipping” process destroy me? The silver cord would be cut, and even if the person on the other side wakes up feeling like me, I would already be gone. It’s consciousness and the vessel for consciousness, not one or the other.
This is the same reason I feel like peoples ideas of being “uploaded to the Matrix” are just as flawed. All of the same talking points but with a digital output. Being uploaded means death because my consciousness will cease to exist and simply be emulated by a computer after.
The only one who gain the benefit of me uploading is everyone but myself.
That one I can almost see happening but not full ‘upload’ style. It would have to be gradual in like a Ship of Theseus’ style where the parts that make you ‘you’ are gradually replaced with digital equivalents.
Well the person being teleported would cease to exist. If life is deterministic then there is no consciousness, just a predetermined path. So my argument is basically that you don’t exist anyways, and by that extension teleportation is not a problem, because the copy is not alive either.
I like your time T example. Kind of a ship of Theseus theme. If your own body is constantly replacing your cells, are you still the same you from last month? So what’s the difference if the cells are replaced by your own biological mechanisms or this teleporter machine?
Also, if this is a copy, why destroy the original in the first place? I could use a second me. Just the they would be located elsewhere for some time. Maybe they could also develop some kind of merge process where we re-integrate back together and our common experiences become part of the same memory.
Still I prefer the concept of some kind of wormhole or space warp type of teleportation, where you can bend space to move from location a to location b and no matter is destroyed or recreated.
i think the big question is continuity of consciousness. when you sleep or especially when getting surgery and dont dream you just sort of accept that you now are the same you that existed before the disconnect. if when you went under and we tossed you into a teleporter would you know?
It’s one or the other. Cogito ergo sum vs. esse est percipi.
Doesn’t matter because your original brain was destroyed. You would be dead and a copy of you would remain.
Was it though? I’d argue it was disassembled. And a pen wouldn’t stop being the same pen if you disassemble it, take the pieces somewhere else, and assemble it again. This is the same but at an atomic level.
Nope. If it makes a perfect copy of you during transport … you die during the transport.
If you come through with a transporter clone your original mind doesn’t inhabit both of them … so your original mind will not inhabit either of them.
What is your “original mind” though? Is there such a thing? Are you the same you you were last night? You only “Inhabit yourself” in the present, so the continuity of your mind is just an illusion. For the clone, they would be as “you” as you are, and in fact it would be impossible to tell the difference between you and your clone for anyone, including yourself. Maybe you’re the clone?
There is an easy logic test to see if a person’s “mind” is really in a clone/copy/backup. If the original and the copy exist at the same time would the original perceive itself in two places? If not, then that “exact copy” method doesn’t work … the original just dies and a near copy is made. Someone mentioned the zombie theory earlier in the post … just about as creepy.
That’s stupid, of course you don’t have access to the brain of a different “you”. The moment you get forked into two, there’s now two separate beings.
But none have more claim to be the original than the other, since your continuous experience of reality is only an illusion anyway.
Why would the “original” be able to perceive itself in two places? Are you able to perceive yourself in the past? That was literally you, yet you only perceive the present. There is no reason why you should be able to perceive a brain identical to yours but separated in space either.
Also the point is the “original” doesn’t make sense in the first place, both the copy and you would perceive the same thing in your hypothetical case, because you are the same.
What is death? If everything is deterministic, then there is no consciousness. If there is no consciousness, then no death and a copy is pretty much exactly the same
Hi, I’m a naturalistic determinist atheist. I won’t be taking a teleporter. The problem is that my body (which my continuous conscious experience resides in) will get erased if I do.
Replace “dismantled by the teleporter” with “shot in the head,” and it might make it a bit more obvious why it matters that the original you dies. I wouldn’t want to be shot in the head, even if I knew there was a perfect facsimile of me being constructed the moment the bullet entered my brain. The fact that this me would die makes intuitive sense to me.
Oh, I am very aware of it being like death. My point is that we were never alive at all. We have no consciousness because of determinism, we follow a path that cannot be changed. That’s why teleportation is not a problem from a deterministic atheist standpoint.
However I do fully acknowledge that I can not live like that. I live as if I have free will, because that is the easiest and most comfortable way to live. Beside nature / nurture arguments of course, I don’t dismiss those.
My point is that we were never alive at all. We have no consciousness because of determinism, we follow a path that cannot be changed.
This doesn’t follow. Consciousness does not necessitate free will. Just because it’s an emergent property of a complex set of deterministic chemical reactions in our brains doesn’t mean it somehow isn’t real.
Deterministic atheism isn’t at odds with a soul or non-physicalism. See: Walden Pod
Can you elaborate?
If you teleport the people off the tracks then you can kill them all while still taking credit for saving them.
Doesn’t that make it even more selfless?
You’ve shed and replaced every atom that you were made of when you were born and many times over since then, are you still that same entity?
Yeah, but you didn’t shed them all at once. If the ship of Theseus exploded, and then they built a new one, the question wouldn’t be, “Which is the true ship of Theseus?” it would be, “Hey, did you guys see Theseus’ new ship?”
How many components have to be changed all at once for it to be a new ship?
If all but one of the planks is new but one of them is from the original ship is it still the original ship, if not then how many planks from the original ship need to be included in the new ship for it to be the original ship?
Look at it’s like that. If you change out one part at a time, everyone considers the ship the same.
Change many components at once and what you hear? “It’s practically a new ship!”.
Here, Ship of Theseus solved by instinct and linguistics.
I don’t know, but I know destroying every cell in your body at once is called suicide.
I’d say that it’s a matter of timescale, very little if anything of the initial version of the USS Constitution is part of the current version of the ship but id consider it the same ship just version whatever because it was slowly replaced over a couple hundred years. It’s the side effect of “living” objects, though if there is one old ass ship that is 100% immune to the Ship of Theseus it’s the Vasa.
It’s all just abstract philosophy on a non-reality scenario, I’m just having fun with it.
On a heavily relative note, though, has anyone watched Space Dandy? The show about a dandy guy in space?
I did, and I remember enjoying it, but that was 10 years ago and I don’t remember it that well. Did they have a teleporter?
They had one, but it was never existential. They had warp, though, and it put them in the same but different dimension when they used it, so Space Dandy’s cosmic energy warped every time he used it, essentially changing him at a material and energy level but not a conscious one. He has a relationship with an energy entity that decides they can’t be with him because he’s literally not the man they fell in love with, and because he’s used the warp so much his energy is essentially changing the fundamental make-up of the universe.
Yeah, I do remember that the series ended with him being given the opportunity to become God (AKA the narrator of the show), and him turning it down, creating a universe without God, which appeared to make everything the same but without narration. I assume that was related to the cosmic energy? Fun idea, but, to bring it back to Theseus, his continued consciousness despite his physical transformation into energy implies the existence of an intangible part of his being (AKA a soul) that continues beyond his human brain. If we ever prove that transporters are teleporting our souls, I’ll happily use one. Otherwise, they are 100% suicide booths.
Meh, I don’t think we have souls, I’d take the suicide booth, it would be cathartic. Especially if it does the fix your health issues thing like the Star Trek teleporters do (except the times it would get in the way of the plot, so it just doesn’t. Because.) maybe I could get a functioning thyroid out of it.
Uh, you OK? That was a borderline SI statement.
Are there any flies buzzing around?
No but theres billions of microbes on you
The Trolly Problem of Thesius
The traveling salesmans trolley problem of Theseus if you try to find out first how to get everywhere efficiently.
Shit like this always remind me of the videogame SOMA.
Have had that game in my library for years, maybe I need to play it
You should. It’s incredible. Just realize it’s a walking sim. If you’re okay with that then def play it.
Yeah that’s fine, Death Stranding was amazing too and that’s mostly a walking sim aswell
That game has the best story and atmosphere I’ve ever seen in my life (maybe except for HL2)
I kinda wish SOMA hit for me but I was already well-aware of the “teleportation problem” and have an established position, so instead I was frustrated at the slow pace of much of the game and annoyed that the protagonist didn’t understand. It felt like “Bioshock at home”.
Half-Life is very different but also extremely good. And that’s despite it not even being my favorite Valve series, Portal is.
If you liked Portal 2, check out The Entropy Centre on Steam. It’s extremely similar but the puzzles are based on a different concept. Super freakin’ fun though. And a great story, just like Portal 2.
Also Portal Revolutions (fan made mod) is absolutely fantastic. It really felt like Portal 3.
And by HL2 you mean Half Life 2? Which has a shitty and unfinished story and way less atmosphere than its original game HL1???
Lol ok buddy.
^ This comment was presented by the Combine.
I mean it though. HL1 was way better, storywise. HL2 just had upgraded graphics that couldn’t make up for worse gameplay. That endless water corridor run with the swamp boat at the beginning bored me to hell and back.
My concern would be less about whether it sends the original or creates a perfect copy, but more about how reliable it is. Getting Riker’d/Boimler’d would be okay, but having more than a negligible chance of any other sort of transporter accident would definitely give me pause.
Do you want tuvix? Because this is how you get tuvix.
Define “you.” An identical collection and pattern of atoms and subatomic particles? Then yes. A continuous consciousness as experienced by the “me” on the entry side of the teleporter? No.
Would I kill myself to save five lives and create one? Yes
There is no way to know that were not constantly dying and being replaced. The experience of continuity may be an illusion because you don’t notice that you’re only alive for a split second, and replacing the consciousness that was alive a split second before you.
Okay? That’s all well and good, but there is a way to know that a transporter does kill you. Given a choice between maybe living or definitely dying, I’m gonna choose the former.
I say there’s no rational reason to assume you aren’t constantly “dying” and being replaced by next moment’s “you”.
You’re not a continuous consciousness anyway. Sleep is a thing.
I’d go deeper and say that “continuous consciousness” isn’t a concept that makes sense. You only live in the moment, with access to part of your past selves’ memories.
So there’s no distinction for you between “you have been destroyed and an identical copy of you has been constructed an imperceptible amont of time later” and “an imperceptible amount of time had passed in which nothing has happened to you”
I’d go deeper and say that “continuous consciousness” isn’t a concept that makes sense. You only live in the moment, with access to part of your past selves’ memories.
I posit that consciousness is a chemical process occurring in your brain. This process is continuously ongoing, and when it stops, you die. If a transporter constructs a perfect copy of you, down to the chemical process that constitutes your consciousness, then there is no continuity between your original body and this new one, because it’s a wholly different brain.
When people talk about continuity of consciousness, they usually mean the ego, and believe that when teleporting “you die, but someone else completely indistinguishable from you but somehow not you” is born.
I say that this little piece of magic “you”-ness that doesn’t make the jump just doesn’t exist.
I already explained how the thing that makes the consciousness continuous doesn’t transfer over to the new body. It’s not magic.
Really, all of this philosophical posturing is pointless. When you step into the entrance of the transporter, the entity that experienced stepping into the entrance of the transporter does not experience stepping out of the exit. If that entity is successfully deconstructed, it dies.
Assuming we’re talking about Star Trek/The Prestige style transporter. Some kind of space-bending wormhole that physically transports a body doesn’t kill the user.
You didn’t explain, you begged the question
If you interrupt a chemical process and then let it continue, it’s indistinguishable (and therefore identical) to letting it continue in the first place.
If you’d e.g. freeze your body, it doesn’t matter if you call the frozen state “dead” or don’t: your life would continue if it’s possible to unfreeze you.
Death or no death is meaningless if an indistinguishable individual resumes life after.
My transporter clone and I may be indistinguishable to you, but I can distinguish between us pretty easily. A transporter is not interrupting a chemical process and then letting it continue, it is stopping a chemical process and then starting another one elsewhere. Death or no death is very meaningful to me, the person who is about to be disintegrated at the entrance of this transporter.
The person who shows up at the lever looks like me, acts like me, thinks they’re me, and they are not me. No matter how arbitrarily similar we are, they’re a different person. If the transporter fails to disintegrate me, I do not see through that person’s eyes. I do not hear through that person’s ears. Because they’re a different person.
So it stands to reason that if the transporter does disintegrate me, I still will not see through that person’s eyes nor hear through that person’s ears. And because my eyes and ears are gone, I will never see or hear anything again. There’s a word for this state of existence, in which you do not experience anything.
I hate that comic. Equivocation is a fallacy. Your alarm clock is proof that you don’t lose experiential consciousness when you sleep.
What comic and no it doesn’t. And reading through your exchange with the other guy it’s clear we have very different ideas about the nature of self-identity. I don’t think of my body as necessary for “me” to exist, I am my thoughts and memory rather than my neurons and chemistry. If that information can be copied and transmitted then there will be a “me” that continues from a new location.
There will be a you, but it’s not the same you. If you read my exchange with the other guy, then what are your thoughts on the “shot in the head” topic? Would you be okay with this you being killed in a very real and visceral way, as long as a you would be reconstructed elsewhere?
This here, although teleporters might actually be implemented in a way that transmits the original being to the destination. It’s a fictional technology after all, so why not?
Yeah, I am assuming Star Trek transporters. If it’s a wormhole then it’s fine
What makes you think that “continuous consciousness” is a thing and not just the way it feels like to exist?
Do you fell like you’re made out of cells? Do you feel the hormones influencing your thinking? Then why do you think that the perceived continuity of having an ego is a real thing that exists? No soul has been measured so far.
I’m not a philosopher, so this response will be imperfect and is subject to revision.
Then why do you think that the perceived continuity of having an ego is a real thing that exists?
My current response to this is that something can exist without being made of something. Consciousness is an emergent property of a sufficiently complex, chemically active neurological system. (Someone can poke holes in this definition if they like, but come on dude, principle of charity. You get what I mean.) Essentially, “how it feels like to exist” is a real, if immaterial, thing. Just like mathematics and language.
If someone makes a perfect copy of my brain and body over by the lever, using none of the materials from my original body, then it is a different brain and body, no matter how arbitrarily similar it is. The consciousness that was by the entrance to the teleporter will never experience pulling the lever.
What makes that “new” consciousness less “you” than the old one? Why do you care if the atoms aren’t the same?
If a perfect copy of me was made, both world be me, and then slowly diverge by different experience. But it doesn’t matter which one has most of the atoms of the body that existed before the duplication (or indeed if any of us was). They’ll both be “me”s with their own perspective and then they’d both continue to exist being “me” from their point of view.
I know how teleportation machines work and I won’t be using one.
Wait, you… you do?
i do too btw
just take any train :-)
Time to post Existential Comics again
I hate this comic. Your alarm clock is proof that you don’t truly lose consciousness in the way this comic implies when you go to sleep.
Yeah, it’s a weakness in the comic, but you can fix it by imagining being frozen (in a sci-fi way that doesn’t form ice crystals that kill you) then thawed.
You’d awake just like from sleep and there would have been a period of true nothing in between.
Did you die and a new you was woken up? I say there is no “true you”. There’s a body having your memories and behavior, thinking it’s you and that’s all that matters. There is no magic piece that actually gets loost when you get frozen or teleported. A you enters, a you leaves, so nobody died and nothing is lost.
There are no souls, there is no magic continuous bit that gets handed over to the next moment, there just the pattern, so as long as it persists, you are alive.
I tend to think what “you” are is the pattern formed by the various electrical and chemical signals in your brain and whatever other parts of your body are involved in cognition, and since patterns are ultimately information, and a completely identical copy of some information is the same information with nothing to distinguish it, that a sufficiently perfect copy of you literally is you, and as such, if the teleporter works the way fictional teleporters are generally described as working, then yes, it is you.
For everyone else, yes. But the you you are now will cease to exist. Your consciousness won’t transfer.
I don’t believe continuity of consciousness is actually required to maintain the identity of consciousness, is the thing. I think that, if you died, and then were brought back some how, you wouldn’t have some “new” consciousness that merely think it’s the first one, but literally would have the first one again, to the degree that such a thing can be called the same from moment to moment even under normal circumstances anyway.
so if i copy myself perfectly while still alive, my consciousness would span both bodies like The Multiple Man?
This is where this idea breaks down for me personally.
No, because you also change with time. You from today are slightly different than what you are yesterday, and you from a second from now will be slightly different from you from right now, because your thinking requires the patterns in your brain to change, just a little. If you copy yourself, both of you will experience different things, and dont have a means to sync those different inputs between you, and so you immediately diverge into two separate if similar entities. Youre both equally a progression of the original and so both are that original person in the same way that you as an adult and you as a kid are the same person, but once diverged youre no longer the same person as eachother. If the teleporter destroys the original while scanning them and then recreates them, theres only ever one of you at once. You only get an issue if you make the copy before destroying the original, because then there are experiences formed after the scanning process, and that new version of the identity is lost.
A bit like how theres a notion you sometimes get in sci-fi or some hypothesis about quantum stuff, that any event where more than one outcome is possible creates a different branching universe for each of the outcomes, and if you could somehow travel to one of those places, you’d find someone that was you up to the point of that event, but now has been shaped by different experiences since.
Would you just have two yous if there were two existing copies?
Youd get two people who are both “you” from before the copying, in the same sense that you are the same you that existed in your past, but arent the same as eachother anymore because they both get different inputs and experiences and develop along different paths.
But if you say that a perfect copy of you is literally you, why would it matter if the “original” is destroyed or not? The result should still be the same (as in a copy that is a separate conciousness) no?
What “you” are changes with time (consider that you’re quite different now from when you were, say, 5). The implication of this is that once a copy is made, new experiences are formed by both copies and their patterns change in divergent ways. If you destroy one after a copy is made, the changes undergone by the destroyed one after the copying aren’t transferred to or recreated again, and so are lost. Or in other words, if you make a perfect copy, they’re identical at the moment of creation, but virtually immediately afterwards won’t be. If you destroy the original before making the copy, then the copy is identical to the original at the moment it is destroyed, ideally, and so the same state last experienced is re-achieved and can develop further.
I’m struggling to think of the proper words to explain my thoughts on this subject, so I’m sure my responses about it are somewhat confusing, and my attempts to elaborate make them fairly long, I’m sorry about that.
Something that I think might be a source of some of that confusion is that I get the impression that many think of consciousness as a distinct nonphysical “thing” that is somehow tethered to the brain, such that the destruction of the brain results in the severing of that connection in a way that means it can’t be caught and pulled back again by any physical process, similar to how people that believe in souls posit them to behave.
I do not believe consciousness works this way. I think that it literally is a specific form of information, or perhaps an emergent effect of certain kinds of information processing, and thus, is a part of the physical universe in the same sort of way that a digital image is (the image itself isn’t “made” of any substance and can be encoded into any form of matter that can be organized into a sufficiently complex arrangement, but that organization physically exists, changing it changes the image, or produces a new but similar one depending on how you define it, and it cannot exist if no matter exists in an arrangement that can encode it), and as a result of that, getting it back just requires getting some matter into an arrangement that encodes it again. The tricky bit is that unlike a digital image, it isn’t a static sort of information but a changing one. So, to take the analogy further, replace the image with a computer program that takes inputs from the world around it, and then rewrites it’s own code in response to those inputs. If you take this algorithm, pause it, copy it’s state and destroy the original machine while rewriting that state into a new machine in a new location, and unpause the program on the new machine, you’d get the same results as if you had just paused it, moved the original machine to the new location and unpaused it at the same time you would have unpaused the copied program. There’s no basis to say that you have a different program, because they have the same code and are behaving the same. But if you unpaused the original machine, its instance of the program will change itself, and then if you destroy it now, the copy won’t reach the state that that last version of the original would have reached had you brought it to the new location too. In this analogy, killing a person is equivalent to one of these programs reaching a state that is no longer continued, so if you continue it later, somewhere else, even on new hardware, that’s fine, and if you create a branch and keep both running, that’s also fine, but if you create a branch, and then destroy one without recording it’s state to recreate it later, or just never actually run it again on a new machine, that branch has reached an end state that doesn’t continue changing itself, and so you’ve had “someone” die.
I think I get what you’re saying, and I completely agree with the first parts. What I don’t quite understand is how the conciousness would differentiate between the two clones in all scenarios.
If we create a copy and pause at the exact moment of creation, where both copies are exactly the same, how would the conciousness “choose bodies”?
If we kill the person first, doesn’t that necessitate that the clone has been killed as well in that case?
Another way to look at it is from a purely spiritual level. As in the soul being an inherited property of life. Every “living thing” from single cells to macro organisms like us has had at least some physical connection to it’s predecessors. We were once a physical part of our mothers body. For every living being a line can theoreticaly be drawn through a “family tree” from now till the moment of random prehistoric carbon chain molecules forming the first cells. So it would be just as valid to assume that a “soul” that emerged sometime in the distant past as a product of complexity is passed down (or rather split off) form our mothers to us. But this begs the question, would a fully artifical “motherless” being have a soul then? It could be just as likely that a perfect reconstruction of yourself would end up being a lifless sack of flesh even though physically there should be no reason for it to be so. It’s like you make a perfect copy of a running car but you measurement was static, therefore your copy wouldn’t be running at the moment of creation. You’d need to also consider the fuel, air, inertia of components and heat as part of the car, but they’re really not. The car can exist in a cold vacuum and with an empty tank and would still be the same car.
It could as well be that you also have to measure a complex electormagnetic signature representing all physical and chemical processes in your body and apply it to your copy for it to function. But since you can ever only get partial electromagnetic information (position or velocity) there is essentially no way to perfectly capture and recreate a 9person and essentially copy a soul. Therefore it can only be passed down continuously.
I’m assuming this is a transporter as exists in Star Trek, and not some kind of wormhole.
Imagine if it didn’t deconstruct your original body, and only made the perfect copy at the exit. Would there be two “yous?” Under your definition, yes, but they are very clearly two separate entities. There is a “you” that walked into the entrance, and there is a “someone else” who walked out of the exit. I think a continuous consciousness is not only relevant, but crucial to a meaningful definition of “you.”
And nobody post that “you die when you fall asleep” comic. It equivocates different definitions ofbghese words in a confusing and misleading way.
I don’t see an issue with having two yous that are nonetheless separate people from eachother, that’s actually exactly what I think would happen in such an instance. Asking which is “you” would be like watching a cell undergo mitosis and then asking which one is the original cell. Continuity mattering seems like a problem to me because it feels like it should require involving something outside the material universe to make it make sense. I’m not sure how best to explain this, but it seems to me that:
- you exist, for obvious reasons, since you perceive yourself
- you aren’t everyone and everything
- the previous two things should mean that there is something about what you are that makes it, you, and not someone else, nor some unconscious zombie
If that thing, whatever it is, is part of the material universe, then the perfect copy must have it too by definition, it wouldn’t be a perfect copy if there was something materially different about it, and then it would have to be you, because it has whatever that thing is that makes it “you”. If that thing exists but is not present in a physically identical copy, then wherever it exists must be outside the physical universe, yet capable of some kind of interaction with it (since presumably you cease if killed materially). That isn’t logically impossible, but requires adding an entire layer to reality to make it make sense, which seems premature when other interpretations don’t require this (and we could end up in the same boat anyway, if I made a thought experiment that suggests some really advanced technology has found a way to manipulate this other layer too, and copies you there as well) Continuity (for anything, not just humans) by itself isn’t really a “thing”. It isn’t made of anything, and doesn’t seem to interact with the physical world in any measurable way. As far as I can tell, it requires making fewer unproven assumptions about how the universe works to assume that continuity is merely a concept we made up due to the manner in which we perceive time, without any actual physical validity to it.
Apologies for the point-by-point reply. I have many responses to many things, which don’t necessarily fit into a cohesive structure of paragraphs.
Asking which is “you” would be like watching a cell undergo mitosis and then asking which one is the original cell.
Disagree. In mitosis, both child cells contain parts of the original. This is akin to Farscape Season 3’s “twinning—” a method of cloning in which neither result has any claim over being the “original.”
This is different from a Star Trek/The Prestige style transporter—you can keep track of which one is the original: it’s the one who went into the entrance. No part of their physical body is present in the transporter clone.
the previous two things should mean that there is something about what you are that makes it, you, and not someone else, nor some unconscious zombie
Yes. A continuous conscious experience. Notably different from an experience of continued consciousness. We must avoid equivocation here. “You” has multiple definitions, some of which are more useful and relevant than others.
If that thing, whatever it is, is part of the material universe, then the perfect copy must have it too by definition, it wouldn’t be a perfect copy if there was something materially different about it, and then it would have to be you, because it has whatever that thing is that makes it “you”.
There is something materially different about the you that steps out of the transporter. They’re made of different atoms and subatomic particles. This isn’t even a Ship of Theseus situation—like, if you replace every single part of your car over the course of a year until every single part is different, there’s some ambiguity about whether it’s the same car as it was the year before. But the car that came off the production line right after it may be made using the same materials in the same pattern, but it is unambiguously a different car.
You could say it’s the “same” car, in that it’s the same color, make and model using the same materials, but if someone crashes it, you would not say they crashed your car, no matter how arbitrarily similar they were at the time of the crash.
Continuity (for anything, not just humans) by itself isn’t really a “thing”. It isn’t made of anything, and doesn’t seem to interact with the physical world in any measurable way.
Continuity isn’t a physical object, but it definitely exists. For one example, the lithium in my phone’s battery is the same lithium that was in it when it was made. The phone would work just fine if the lithium atoms were constantly being replaced, but they don’t seem to be. Continuity is a real phenomenon.
The bit about things being made of different subatomic particles is interesting, because its actually, to my knowledge, difficult to truly prove that, because fundamental enough particles dont seem to have a lot of the differences seen between similar objects of larger scale. There are even ideas (not proven ones mind, just food for thought) that some of them might actually be the same, for example, theres an idea that there might be just one electron in the universe that bounces around in time and space such as to look like there are more of it: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-electron_universe
My point there though, is if “different” fundamental particles are so similar as for it to not even be clear that they are necessarily different, what would the underlying mechanism be for a notable difference to using different ones?
Im not really convinced by your final bit about continuity, but I think its more down to my difficulty in explaining what I mean exactly by calling it not real. I dont mean to say that we cant define a label for an idea like “no atoms entered or left this battery pack”, but rather that theres no particular indication that the universe “cares” (cares really isnt the right word but I simply cant think of the right one and I guess cares is as close as I can think of, just strip the part out that implies conscious intent or thinking) about that label once we’ve defined it.
If we return to your analogy of cars, “cars” also arent really real, not in the sense that the concept applies only to things that are completely fictional the way, say “vampires” does, but in a sense like, there is a fundamental, non-arbitrary difference between, say, an electron and a photon, such that they interact with the physical laws of the universe in a distinct way. A car meanwhile, is just a collection of these fundamental particles, which does not have any distinct rules for itself among the physical laws of the universe, and rather has behavior that is merely emergent from its constituent parts following the behavior of those particles. The universe has no distinct concept that a given mass is a “car”, but does seem to for an electron (again, “concept” isnt really the right word because it implies thinking and intent, which Im not trying to ascribe to the universe here, but again I struggle to find a word that better fits the idea that Im trying to communicate).
If, suddenly, every electron, proton etc (fundamental particles that is) in your phone’s battery were suddenly swapped with others of the same type of particle from elsewhere in the universe, there would be absolutely no way to detect it. Presumably, this would break the continuity of that battery, but if we took a snapshot of the universe right before the swap, and one immediately after such that no time has passed between them, the only way there could be any difference at all between them would be if there was some kind of unique “label” for each particle fundamental particle to make them distinct from one another, something that, as far as I am aware, there isnt any evidence to suggest is the case. Without that added layer of complexity added to the universe, the swap would be like swapping one pixel of an image with another pixel elsewhere in the image that has the exact same color value- the result there wouldnt be a new image, because no information has been changed, it would just be the exact same image again. That is to say, the particle swap wouldnt be physically meaningful at all, unless you assume the universe has that specific unproven property added to make fundamental particles non-interchangeable, which occams razor would suggest I discount until proven otherwise, because a universe with non-unique fundamental particles is simpler than one with extra information to distinguish each. And if that swap isnt physically meaningful, then the universe before and after the swap dont have any change in information to them that could represent the break in continuity in the first place, which drives me to the conclusion that either continuity somehow exists outside the universe, which again adds another unneeded bit of complexity to reality that I can discount as less likely with occam’s razor, or else that the concept of continuity is just one of the many made-up concepts that we use to help make the universe easier to think about, like labeling some arrangements of matter “cars” based on their general emergent properties, that dont have any true basis in the physical laws that actually describe the behavior of the universe.
Your consciousness ceases to exist every time you go to sleep though. Your brain changes significantly during sleep - memories are solidified, motor skills will be hardened etc. The new consciousness is clearly different from the old one. Why is teleportation so different?
No it doesn’t. What we call “unconsciousness” is really just reduced consciousness. Your mind is maintained and you remain aware of external stimuli, just to a much weaker degree.
Not really. You dream, even if you don’t remember it. So there’s some continuity there. It’s not the same thing as turning it off and on again. Like there will be a consciousness in your body, and it will be identical (at least for up to a second or two) to the consciousness you are now. But it won’t be the same consciousness. Or at least it’s not clear to me that it is.
I think the real argument or concern behind this is, do we have a soul?
If not, then yes, stepping into a transporter means that you die, and that some other version of you continues on, but that doesn’t matter because nothing was actually lost.
If we do have a soul, then the question becomes, does your soul survive the transport?
If it does, then it’s no worries, it’s just a means of transportation.
But if it doesn’t, then does the version of you that pops out of the other side have a brand new soul, or is it now soulless?
And finally, how could we ever tell?
I think the first of those approximates my view, just with the added caveat that your consciousness is “something”, since we use the word to describe some aspect of our experience even if we don’t fully understand it, and if there’s no physical basis for anything to have been lost in this process because the copy is the same, that implies to me that your consciousness must have been preserved or recreated as well.